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oral and visual tradition of Appalachia by creating a central archive at
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Microfilm Corporation of America. To date, approximately 4,200 pages of
transcribed tapes have been published as part of the New York Times Oral
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from the sale of the transcripts are earmarked for the continuation of
the program.
The first interviews were conducted by Marshall University History
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program, many interviews are conducted by the Oral History staff. Graduate
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special topic courses in oral history under the supervision of Dr. Robert
Maddox, program director since September 1978.
The program seeks to establish contacts with as broad a variety of
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the specific work experience. In the whole life category, the interviewer
attempts to guide cubtly the interviewee through as much of his or her life
as can be remembered. The second type isolates a specific work or life
experience peculiar to the Appalachian region and examines it in detail.
Although both types of interviews are currently being conducted, emphasis
is now placed on the specific work experience. Recent projects are concerned
primarily with health care, coal mining, and the growth of labor organizations.
Parts II and III of the Oral History of Appalachia collection were
compiled by Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director, and processed by Ms. Brenda
Perego.
Dr. Robert F. Maddox, Director
Ms. Brenda Perego, Processor

Dated:

RFM:

February 17, 1981

John Sherman Cooper

An interview with John Sherman Cooper, August 28, 1980
in his office in the Covington and Burling Law Office,
888 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, DoC. 20006.
The interview is conducted by Robert Franklin Maddox,
Director of the Oral History of Appalachia Project,
Marshall University.

The interview was conducted as

part of the background research for an art-, for a chapter
in a book dealing with John Sherman Cooper's opposition to
the Vietnam Waro

The interview deals primarily with the

question of Vietnam and Cooper's positions in the United
States Senate on Vietnam.
This has got about forty - five minutes on that side.
Now what in your background and experience, uh, caused
you to oppose the American intervention in Southeast Asia?
JSC:

Well, to be honest I did not oppose it at first,
I doubted its wisdom.

although

In one of the articles from the

Congressional Record, which I'll give you today, from a
debate on the Senate floor,

I outlined in general the

history of the war as I had studied it.
long.

It won't take

I have always thought that the French were primarily

responsible for the Vietnam war.

The Japanese humiliated

the French in World War II, who controlled Vietnam, North
and South, Laos, and drove them out.

After the close of

r
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World War II, there was some talk the United States and
Great Britain propose a trust territory.
with all of that great pride i-RFM:

But the French

(Laughs) . / immediately,

without consultation with Great Britain or the United States,
sent the puppet Emperor Bao Dai back to North Vietnamo

Ho

Chi Minh, the popular leader, did not wish to oppose the
Frenc~ at that time.

But later the French fired upon a

meeting of a North Vietnamese group under Ho Chi Minh in
Hanoi and the war between the French and the Vietna~ese
began.

Vietnam then was united as a whole, North and South

Vietnam, and at the battle of Dien, Dien Phu or Bien Dien
Phu, I don't always (laughs) get the correct name, the

r

f

French forces were disastrously defeated and had to evacuate
Vietnam.

At that time President Eisenhower was President.

There were some who thought that the United States should
intervene by land forces or by air.
refused to do so.

President Eisenhower

He sent one of his trusted military

aavisors, I believe General Ridgeway, who had served under
him in Europe and who reported ba~k, as Eisenhower believed,
that there was no possible chance to win in guerrilla
warfare.

At least it wasn't important to our securityo

Eisenhower refused to send in troops, and this should
always be remembered.

It will be recalled, negotiations

went on and in the Geneva Accords it was agreed that North
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3

Vietnam and South Vietnam would be divided on the thirtyeighth parallel, that there would be a neutral zone, three
to five miles wide, on which troops would not be stationed.
But it was agreed, as the French and British insisted, that
there would be elections to eventually unite Vietnam.
John Foster Dulles was our Secretary of State.

Mr.

He refused

to sign the Accords, but said that he supported them in
substance, on the condition there would be free elections.
RFM:

Do you think President Eisenhower, uh, did this because he
was a military man and really understood the implications
of an American intervention?

JSC:

What?

RFM:

Do you think that President Eisenhower was able to, uh,
you know, kind of prevent an A~erican intervention because
he, he did have a military background

L

JSC:

Absolutely._/

and was not as impressed with the military staff?
JSC:

Yes, he knew that.

I knew him well when he became President_

Before, I knew him well when he was Commander of NATO Forces
and had talked to him in 1951 in Paris.
awful World War II.

He had seen the

You will remember he refused to send

troops when Great Britain, France and Israel tried to take
over the Suez Canal from Egypt.

They didn't consult him

but he said he was strongly opposed to American participation.
I don't want to say condemn, he wasn't that kind of man, but

John Sherman Cooper
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He wouldn't send troops.

did send troops into Lebanon once.
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He

When there was a threat

to Lebanon, then a very free and neutral country.
some troops there and the threat disappeared.

He sent

He did leave

six hundred military personnel in South Vietnam as civilian
and military advisors to help ambassadors to the South
Vietnam Government and the South Vietnamese Army.

It wasn't

long until war broke out between North and South Vietnam .
I think one must remember in all fairness that the aggressors
came from the North, from North Vietnam.

With one exception,

the later bombing of North Vietnam and Haiphong harbor under
President Johnson and some minor retaliatory raids7 all the
aggression, the attacking troops, the North Vietnamese moving
into South Vietnam either directly through the demilitarized
zone or down through Laos and Cambodia on what was called
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In retrospect, I believe that was

aggression by North Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh always had

determined that he was going to take over South Vietnam.
I don't know what he thought about Cru~bodia, but the North
Vietnamese have now taken over Cambodia and Laos and
reestablished the old Siamese Empire as a Communist state.
I will only say this about my feeling at the time of
the French return to Vietnam in 1954.

The British Broadcasting

Company, BBC, asked Senator Mansfield of Montana, a D·emocrat,

John Sherman Cooper

and me to appear on a program about Vietnam.
of the defeat of the, the French in 1954.

At the time

I think they

probably thought because we were of different parties we'd
take (laughs) opposite stances.

But both of us said under

no circumstances should the United States ever intervene
in South Vietnam, nor in North Vietnam.

(Laughs) I think

it ruined their program but that's what we said in 1954.
RFM:

Now what, why did you believe that in 1954?

JSC:

Well I was pretty old, 53 years, but I went through World
War II.

I spent almost two years in the Third Army under

General Patton.

I wasn't in the first line troops but I

was a messenger, taking messages up to different divisions
and different units in combato
saw what happened.
dead men.

I saw an awful lot and I

Cities destroyed, people killed.

I saw the newly buried graves.

penned into stockades.

I saw

I saw prisoners

I saw the concentration camp, the

first one captured by the Americans in East Germany at
Buchenwald.

I happened to be taking a message to US troops

occupying Buchenwald the day of its capture
right?_/.

I was there one half an hour

L

RFM:

after it was taken by the American soldiers.
ran off and there really wasn't any fight.

L

RFM:

Is that

Oh my God._/
The Hitler SS

But before they

left they killed forty or fifty of those poor immates who
were lying around.

Twenty thousand starved immates were

5
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lying on shelves in barracks ana nearby were three crematoriums where they burned the dead bodies.
of war,

L

RFM:

I saw the violence

Okay._/ I came to believe that war solves

nothing, unless we actually have to protect our country
and people's security.

Ana it didn't seem to me, and it

doesn't now, that Vietnam involved our security.
RFM:

Course that, that's actually the traditional, that's the
traditional American positiono

JSC:

Yes.

RFM:

Up into, uh, the twentieth century.

JSC:

Yes.

RFM:

Is, is, uh, exactly the way you expressed it for defense,
period.

JSC:

Home ana hearth ana, ana that kind of thing.

You will remember that George Kennan, a famous scholar, a
State Department expert on Russia, Ambassador to Russia,
had first proposed what was called the Containment Theory,
to hold Russia in, to prevent then aggression.

John Foster

Dulles accepted the theory that we should protect, if possible,
all free countries where there was aggression against them.
President Truman accepted the position in Koreao

He sent

US troops in without Congressional authority when Korea
was attacked~

Dulles and Eisenhower were very close.

I'm

sure that Dulles influenced Eisenhower on general principles
of foreign policy but he couldn't budge him on military action.

.
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L
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Yes._/ we see

a, you know, a step up in activity in 1961 and particularly
in 1962 and you opposed, uh, uh, any potential sending of
troops into Southeast Asia

L

JSC:

Yes._/ in 1962.

the same reasons of 1954 would you say,/ JSC:

For

Yes._/ or

was the situation a little different?
JSC:

It is hardly known and never hardly mentioned but, and I
say this in deep respect for President Kennedy.

In the

short time he lived we know what he did to protect our
security when the Soviets were bringing nuclear weapons
into Cuba.

It took great courage to do that.

to be in Washingtono

It was in the fall.

I happened

We were all out

campaigning when we were asked to report, at least Senator
Morton and myself, either to Atlanta or Washington.
I came to Washington.

Well,

I went to the State Department, got

some briefing, then I went over to the White House.

President

Kennedy, with whom I had served for six years, heard I was in
the White House and asked me to come up to private quarters
where he was sitting in his rocking chair.

He told me what

he'd done, that our ships were moving out and they were going
to stop the blockade.

They were going to blockade the

Russians and ·he said they will turn backo

He said, "I know

it's a critical time but thank God, they will turn back,"

L

RFM:

Yeah._/.

But he did send, I can't give you the exact
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number, someplace between twelve an::! fifteen thousand troops
to South Vietnam to assist Vietnam, Vietnamese forces.
were not supposed to enter into active combat.

They

I know all

this because I talked to the group of Senators who went to
Vietnam to find out the situation regarding our troops.

They

stated our planes and forces were asked to ferry South
Vietnamese troops up to the thirty-eighth parallel which
had been breached by the North Vietnam and had carried out
a terrible massacre at the city of Hue in North Vietnam.
But of course our planes were fired on and our men had to
fire back to protect themselves and we were in the war.

It

illustrated the danger of sending troops abroad when we are
not in war.
I have the view that President Kennedy would never have
engaged in the war we finally found ourself in.

I believe

that he would have found a way to withdraw our troops with
honor through acceptance of the Geneva Accords before we
had so many killed and got in so deeply.
why I say that.

You may ask me

I have no substantial facts for it except

my own knowledge of President Kennedy.

We served together

for several years on the Committee on Labor.

I think because

we were so different in ages and I was a Republican and he
was a Democrat he would talk to me when he might not talk
to, to others. He also sent me on a mission once, which

John Sherman Cooper
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I'll have to write about sometime, it was to Moscow before
he was inaugurated, to talk to the Russian leaders, which
showed he had some trust in me.

But sadly, when he was

assassinated in 1964 I would say then that's when the
beginning of the real American involvement opened up in Vietnam .
RFM:

Okay, now since you, uh, we're moving from Kennedy into
Johnson

L

JSC :

Um, mmm._/ and you've indicated that you

didn't think that Kennedy would have expanded the war in
quite that way.

Uh, and then we find Lyndon Johnson, uh, who,

you know, obviously, uh, expanded American involvement there

L

JSC :

Yes._/.

Uh, again do you think it was because, as in

the case of Eisenhower, Eisenhower wasn't as impressed with
the military?

Uh, do you think Kennedy was not as impressed

with some of his advisors in the military as was Lyndon Johnson?
JSC:

Well, about that, I think they were of different natures .
knew both of them, served in the Senate with then.

I

I talked

to Kennedy a great deal because of our Committee on Laboro

I

think he confided in me because he knew I wasn't talking to
anybody about what he said.

L

RFM:

Also,/ RFM:

Yeah._/ you know,

Sure._/ we had no conflicting a:nbitions, I wasn't

running for President

L

RFM:

Yeah, sure._/.

Then President

Johnson, in 1964 President Johnson presented to the Senate
the Tonkin Gulf Revolution/ RFM:

Okay._/.

Now I must say

right here that (papers shuffling) I was one that voted for it.
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There were two votes against it, Senator Gruening, of Alaska
and Senator Morse of Oregon .
what I was doing.

I have to confess that I knew

The resolution had two parts.

was constitutional o

The first

It gave to the President the authority

to protect our troops, an authority which he already possessed.
Second, it gave him the authority to take such measures as he
thought necessary to carry out the provisions of the SEATO
Treaty countries to the South, Eastern Asia Treaty, which
included as sponsors Great Britain, Pakistan, Australia,
New Zealand, France, and others.

The second provision was

designed to take measures to defend the protocol states,
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos according to our constitutional
process .
process

But the resolution did not define constitutional

L

RFM :

Yeah._/.

I had studied all the treaties

the US entered into since World War II .

They involved forty -

two countries, not that many treaties because some of them
were multi-lateral, with a number of parties, and some bilateral like Japan and the United States.

But the same

wording appeared in all, ''according to the parties constitutional
processeso"

The Foreign Relations Committee, in every case,

refused to interpret the langua~e as requiring approval by
the full Congress to commit US forcesa

I knew that the Tonkin

Gulf Resolution would give the President the power if he
wanted it.

On the day the amendment came up in the Senate,

John Sherman Cooper
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L

RFM:

11

Yeah._/

a fancy word, a question and answer period, with Senator
Fulbright. who was managing the bill.

I wasn't on the Foreign

Relations Committee at that time.

I asked his view of the

authority given to the President.

I asked him if we were

not giying the President the authority to send troops and

to

enter into war in protection of these countries if he so
decided.

Senator Fulbright said, "yes."

Later, and I don't

say this in criticism, he said he'd been fooled by Johnson
during the hearings who had not told all the circumstances
about the attack on our shipso
the hearings.

I don't know what went on in

I would say that Secretary Rusk of State was

one of the most honest men I ever knew.

The Tonkin Gulf

Resolution grew out of the firing on an American vessel off
the coast of North Vietnam

L

RFM:

Yeah, the USS Maddox._/o

I believe it was fired on, I have no doubt about it.

The

question is, would retaliation have been enough - fired back
at it and attack against North Vietna~ shore buttresses?

The

hearings required more investigation before asking for the
broad Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
was doing when I voted.

I have to say I knew what I

It appears in the Congressional

Record and when President Johnson wrote his memoires he
included my question and answer debate with Senator Fulbright
in his book.

He did that I'm sure because he got awful angry

John Sherman Cooper
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L

RFM:

(Laughs.)_/.
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He wanted to

show that Senator Fulbright agreed with me, that we were
giving him this authority if he decided to use it.

But I,

like the rest, had the general feeling that I didn't believe
really that he would engage the US in th e war that followed.
Later, I recall that President Johnson came up to the Capitol
one day and called a number, curiously enough~ not into Mike
Mansfield's office, who was then the Democratic Leader of the
Senate, who had succeeded Johnson as the leader (laughs).

L

But he asked us to meet in Senator Dirkson's office
that right?_/ who, who was the Republican leader.
there were about thirty there.

RFM:

Is

I remember

People from the Foreign

Relations Committee, people from the Armed Services Committee
and, and others.

He told us he was going to send thirty - five

thousand troops to Vietnam.
that time and it was a shock.

That was the largest number at
I can remember Senator Saltonstall,

who was a very quiet man who usually went along with any
administration.

A very honorable man from Massa::husettes,

who was the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee.
He spoke up vigorously and said, "I think it's wrong, Lyndon."
That's the first time I think I had heard him
right?_/ oppo$e a President.
clean it up."

L

RFM:

Is that

Oh, but Johnson said, "We' 11 just

Well you know what followed.

raids from the North into South Vietnam.

More and more

They came in

John Sherman Cooper
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Laos aha Cambodia through the demilitarized zone, agreed on
in the Geneva Accords and they were all through the northern
parto

They got into the southern part, south of what's now

called Ho Chi Minh City but was then Saigon, the capitol of
South Vietnam.
about '66.

Then in 1965 we began to bomb North Vietnam

I began to speak against the bombing of North

Vietnam on the premise that cessation of bombing, it might
bring about the possibility of negotiations.

I remember

President Johnson called me down to his office several times.
He was always courteous but he would say we have stopped
bombing several times.

I told him, "yes, but you've done it

on their holidays, religious holidays, for a few days, and
as soon as their religious holidays are over you've started
again."
at all

"My judgement is they don't consider you've stopped

L

(Laughs o) /."

RFM:

I told him, I'm not saying

forever, but for a month or two and it's not doing any damage.
You haven't bombed anything up there that would really damage
North Vietnamo

Such as their chief sources of water supply

which produce very good.

If they were bombed it would flood

one of their great rivers and sources of supplieso

But always

underneath there was the question whether China or Russia
would intervene.

They were both in competition supplying

North Korea and I think, as I spoke in 1966, one would have
intervened.

I don't know what else the President would have

John Sherman Cooper
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done unless he'd invaded North Korea, and without China or
Russia intervening, he might have very well invaded North
Korea.

If he'd had done that in the flat part of the war,

he probably would have to defeat North Vietnam, but again
with Congressional authorization.

But when the casuality

list came in the real furor in our country begun and opposition
began to develop throughout the United States.
RFM:

Do you think, uh, General Westmoreland's policy of using
search and destroy missions, war of attrition

L

JSC:

Huh?_/.

Do you think General Westmoreland's actions in using the
search and destroy missions, do you think this was the
proper kind of activity?
JSC:

Well I'm not a military expert, I visited with Vietnam twice.
curiously enough, it was in '65 and '66.
headquarters.

I went to his

I knew him as he formerly was in command of

Fort Campbell in Kentucky, and as a fine military field
commander.

It's on the line between Kentucky and Tennessee.

They're still fighting about the name of the post office

L

RFM:

(Laughs.)_/o

But I visited and of course I, in those

briefings him and his staff (break in conversation, noise in
background).
RFM:

Here, let me get you one.

JSC:

The books say, I was looking for the cigarettes.

RFM:

There you go.

Be in your coat over here?

John Sherman Cooper
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Yes.

JS

Oh, they would say that we are gradually winning by

our Vietnamesation program in the villages where they had
a security force there and by our search and destroy program
sending out patrols, and we just need more men.
1

65.

By chance I went back in

1

That was in

66, and I went with Dean

Rusk, he asked me to go and course I didn't sit in on the
conferences with the leader.

They had a different leader

first time I was out there (coughs).
name, the second time was Ky,

I can't remember his

(spells) K-Y, and I remember

we all had dinner one night up in his private place.

He had

a little place in the airport: he had his own helicopter in
his garden and guards everywhere.

Then again General Westmoreland

was very confident they would eventually win but always there
was the request to send more troop, more troops.

The second

time I was in Saigon I noticed one official from the State
Department who was pretty quiet when the rest talked more
confidently and I asked him if he would see me later.
him if he would have a talk with meo

I asked

We talked for about an

hour and he told me of course he supported policies, support
by the government, our ambassador, State Department, the
commander's policy.
end of the tunnel.

But he said, "I can see no light at the
I don't think we're going to get out of it."

RFM:

And this, you were saying this in '65 and '66?

JSC:

'66 - not without negotiations or an even greater war.

John Sherman Cooper

RFM:
JSC:
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66, okay.

One thing our leaders in South Vietnam complained about and
I think correctly, the two times I was there, was that the
US media was very unfair painting the worst picture of US
military actions.

They had played up in contrast the killing

of Vietnamese civilians by the American captain at • • •
RFM:

My Lai.

JSC:

What?

RFM:

At My Lai.

JSC:

Yes, yea.
Vietnam.
citizens.

Our forces spoke of Hue in the North of South
Vietnamese had overrun and murdered South Vietnamese
The A.merican military leaders said, and I think

truthfully that the North Vietnamese had invaded Hue and
slaughtered people by the hundreds, private citizens.

They

told me, General Westmoreland did, and our civilian officials
had without success begged the American photographers and
television people and media to go there and record the
slaughter, as they did about My Lai later.

They felt that the

American media did not report fairly on even what limited
successes they had.
RFM:

Okay, I tell you, let 1 s stop a second and let me flip this
tape.

JSC:

Allright.

RFM:

Okay, now, uh, in 1966 you began to, uh, speak out more and

r
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more that Congress should take a more active role

L

JSC:

Yes._/ in a, t_JSC:

Committee._/.

I was on the Foreign Relations

You began to feel, I think, from looking at

some of the things you said, that the President was exceeding
his authority.

So we came into a constitutional question

and a constitutional crisis and even though at that point
you seem to feel that Congress should focus its attention
on the escalation of the war and not policy itself.

Now

why did you take the position that it should be escalation
cnd not policy?

JSC:

What?

RFM:

Escalation of the war and not the policy which the Johnson
Administration was, was evolving in Vietnam.

JSC:

Well it was policy.

I actually became a member of the

Foreign Relations Committee.
on it, beginning in 1966.

Let's see, I served six years

In 1967 I studied the authority

of the President and Congressional war making power.

Senator

Fulbright and others began to talk about the relative powers
of the Executive and the Congress toward committing troops
abroad without the consent of the Congresso

Senator Fulbright

introduced a resolution which he called the Commitments
Resolution and which appears in the text of this speech that
I will give to you.

I did not think his wording of the

Resolution was precise enough although he's a finely educated

John Sherman Cooper
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Yeah._/ and had been on the Foreign Relations

Committee for many years and a fine chairman.
thought it was redundant.

But I, I

It ended up in a circle.

I

offered a substitute which was defeated by the committee
and his version was reported by the Committee to the Senate.
When it got on the floor a good many objections were raised
along the lines I had suggested.

He came over to me and

asked me if he could offer my version as a substitute for
his, the one which was before the Senate.

I said of course.

So he then presented mine and it was accepted by the Senate
and it became the Fulbright Resolution, as amended by Senator
Coopero

Its

wording and substance was that the President

r
had no authority to engage the United States in war or to
send troops into a situation which might involve us in war
without the consent of the Congress.
voted for it.

Practically everybody

I think many of the people on the Armed Services

Committee voted for it.

Senator Stennis, its Chairman, who's

a wonderful man, and who always supported the President in
military matters, joined in voting for it.

And so while it

is the initiative of Senator Fulbright, the actual wording
is mine.

Well then in '69 the Armed Services Committee

voted out a bill authorizing aid in different fashions to
Thailand, Laos as well as Vietnamo
same.

The language was the

It didn't say troops, it did mention material,
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equipment, and all that, but it offered aid and it was not
defined exactly.

Remembering the Fulbright-Cooper Commitments

Resolution, I questioned Senator Stennis, who had charge of
the bill, if this would mean we could give, put forces,
American forces in Laos or Thailand.
had forces there

L

RFM:

Curiously, we already

(Laughs.)_/ so I wasn't really,

wasn't questioning that so mucho

There were 36,000 or 40,000

American troops in Thailand then at air bases and Sera.tor
Stennis was very fairo

He said he, he was not intending to

authorize troops, only in his view, supplies.

But he

recognized that it was a question which had to be considered.
It was debated one evening and several Senators attacked me
pretty vigorously.

Senator Tower of Texas thought I was

endangering American troops in South Vietnam if my amendment
were adopted.

I said then you speak to the Department of

Defense about it and we will bring it up another day.

It

was brought up another day and the Senate accepted my amendment
or, or moved it in such a way that it would, it would not
allow troops to be used in Laoso
in Thailand.

The US already had troops

Cambodia wasn't much considered at the time

because it was considered to be a neutral country.

But the

truth of the matter is we were actually, which we found out
later, in Cambodiao
to Laos and Cambodia.

Senator Fulbright sent two messengers
Our Ambassador to Laos was a practical

r

John Sherman Cooper

general there in charge of our troops.

20

There was some

authority for this position because the Ho Chi Minh Trail
ran through Laos and Cambodia and of course we had a right
to attack the trail.

The law in war is that you have the

right to attack to protect your troops.

But the US was

extending our air forces through other areas of Laos.
RFM:

Okay.

One thing I want to get back a little bit, uh, did

you at some point come to the conclusion that despite all
the American aid that the South Vietnamese were unable to
defend themselves or come up with a stable form of government,
did you
JSC:

L

JSC:

Yes._/ ultimately come to that conclusion?

That always changes.

I, I said I remember in '65 they had

a man in charge who was President.

r

There were changes, he

had been pushed out and with the assent of the US.
President was Ky, to whom I have referred.

The next

He was an air

force marshall, very vain and wanted to be the head man,
even above the American Commander.

He didn't last long.

the dinner I attended at Ky's, we ate outdoorso
a man named Thieu there,

At

There was

(spells) T-H-I-E-U, and everybody

said he's the best man in the cabinet, both US and TW
personnel.

He later became President and he held the office

till the end of the war, and was condemned as ineffective by
opponents of the war.

It was the North Vietnamese fighting

a hard war to win (it is said the people from the north are
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stronger and harder fighters than people from the south.).
I wouldn't say that's true, when we think of our Civil War

L

RFM:

(Laughs.) /.

But it was trueo

have survived without American help.

South Vietnam couldn't
The next matter of

Senate interest ca~e up by way of rumor or leak.
always are leaks, f_ RFM:
them out.

There

Yeah._/ sometimes the press finds

Somebody leaks and sometimes the government leaks.

I don't think the government leaked in this case, but there
were rumors that United States troops with the South Vietnamese
were going to invade Cambodia.

They were to attack (coughs)

a large communication center in Cambodia and ammunition dumps
used by the North Vietnamese.

But curiously enough, we called

Secretary of State Rogers before the committee,
before Mr. Kissinger took over).

(that was

Secretary Rogers is a very

honest man and he just said flatly, "I cannot respond to you."
Considering what has passed since then I can't tell you
whether he knew or didn't know (laughter).

Perhaps the

National Security Council under President Nixon's Administration
and President Ford's and now President Carter, had taken over
the authority of the Secretary of State.
RFM:

The whole thing, right?

JSC:

Secretary Rogers was a very honest man, straight man, and as
you know, he resigned as Secretary after a while.

I don't

know whether he knew or not about the projected invasion of
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But if he did know he, he was not going to tell

Well within a day or two, I proposed to Senator Aiken

of Vermont, a wise man, and to Senator Mansfield, Democratic
Leader, we offer an amendment prohibiting in a constitutional
way the use of any funds to send American troops into Cambodia.
/

It is a power of the Congress under the constitution .
Frank Church joined me in its introduction.

Senator

He was on the

Foreign Relations Committee, as were Mansfield and Aikeno
Senators Mansfield and Aiken were very influential men in
-the Senate.

Everyone, the press, always call the amendment the

Cooper- Church Amendment, but Senators Mansfield and Aiken were
also on it and their influence was very helpfulo

Again,

curiously, the day we were going to introduce our amendment
(laughs) the, the President sent troops into Cambodia,

L

RFM:

(Laughs.)_/ but we introduced our amendment any way.

It was followed by a debate which lasted two or three months.
The President had a ~eeting at the White House with us and
other members of the Congress, both opposing and supporting
the US invasion.
a date certain.

He agreed that he would withdraw troops on
As I recall it was June the first or July

first, about sixty days in the future.
all that time.

The debate continued

We wanted our amendment passed not only to

assure that they withdraw but to prevent a future invasion
and also to establish the principle that the President could
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not expand the war into another country without the authority
of the Congress.
RFM:

Now didn't Congress also bout the same time repeal the Gulf
of Tonkin interest?

JSC:

Yes, they repealed it.

I do

not think it helped as a matter

of fact, as our troops were already in Cambodia and under the
President's power of protection.

Finally after the date the

President had set (Senator Cooper's secretary enters the room).
Thank you

L

Secretary:

Sure._/.

O~r amendment passed.

in the Senate-House conference it was reduced.

But

Ours prohibited

the use of any American forces, ground, air, whatever.

In

conference the House insisted that it could only cover ground
troops and the Senate accepted the compromise as . the best we
could do.

The amendment was passed and the President signed

it, and it was the first legislation in history passed
inhibiting the war powers of the President.
was also extended to Laos.

And the amendment

But in both cases, as reduced by

the House, it only referred to ground troops.

We found out

later that US air forces were used in both Cambodia.and Laos.
RFM:

How do you react to the critics, uh, of that amendment who
say that this was an encroachment on Presidential authority,
course you're · really in a gray area
degree.

JSC:

L

JSC:

Yes._/ to a certain

But how do you react to critics, uh, you know?

Well I have had many critics on that point.

We had lots of
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Yeah._/

from all over the country to Washington, corning into our
office to talk.

I left the door open.

them, everybody I saw.

I talked to all of

I also got thousands of letters,

and I think I answered a great many of them.

But they came,

such a volume, I don't believe a lot of them were ever answered,
thousands from the entire country.

I did get up a printed

letter expressing my position and that of my colleagues, which
I sent to those who were for or against the amendment, explaining.
The same letter went to all.

Those against it were very vicious

at times, mostly very critical, some viciouso

Some without

signing their name would call me obscene names

(laughter).

Some signed their name too.

But I just sent them the same

letter, of course the anonomous I couldn't answer any way.
But I was convinced we had adopted the right course, that it
was the constitutional authority of the Congress to provide
funds for the war or to cut the funds off if it chose to do
so, that was the proper course.

Now there were a~endments

offered by Senator Hatfield just to set a date when we should
withdraw from all of Vietna~.

I voted against that and I was

criticised very strongly, but I felt that the Congress only
constituted authority through the power of the purse.

But

we didn't have the authority to tell the President, withdraw
our troops on a certain day . where they might be in mutual danger.
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That was going too far and these amendments lost by large
votes.

Finally whenfue President announced, I think it was

in 1972 that he was going to withdraw the troops on a day
certain, then I did introduce an amendment that they should
be withdrawn on that day that he had fixed.
RFM:

Do you think the precedent which,

L

JSC:

But it was never

voted on./ do you think the precedent which was set by the
Cooper-Church Amendment will, uh, in effect prevent some
kind of way, you know, that they did in Vietnam?
JSC:

Oh, that depends on the circumstances.

Later Senator Javits

and Senator Eagleton and curiously enough Senator Stennis
introduced what they call the War Power Bill

L

RFM:

Yeah._/.

I voted for it but I wrote an individual view saying I voted
for it because I thought it was a necessary guideline and
proper in its objectives. but I thought it was unconstitutional.
For this reason.

It provides that in the event of an attack

on the US, its forces or people, if fue circumstances weren't
such which affected our immediate security, the President had
to convene the Congress.

If, if there were circumstances such

as we were being attacked, of course, he'd have the constitional
right on his own initiative to defend the country, troops, and
people.

The bill stated that within thirty days the Congress

should meet and then decide whether or not our troops would
be withdrawn, and the war stopped.

Well my thought was if
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the same circumstances prevailed sixty days later that had
prevailed when he had the constitutional right to commit
our troops, that constitutional right continued to protect our
security and forces and it was doubtful whether Congress could
order him to withdraw troops unless the Congress cut off fundso
RFM:

Okay.

Now, President Nixon, uh, of course ran in 1968, uh,

implying that he would end the war.
JSC:

Yes.

RFM:

Now do you think that he was honestly committed to that course
of action, uh, which ultimately became the Vietnamesation
policy, uh, or do you think this was political rhetoric or
do you think he gave us a little more of the same or, uh, •

JSC:

Well I think that he was co:nrnitted, but after he entered office,
400,000 US troops were in Vietnam that was enough.
since he came to Congress.

I knew him

He was in the House and I was in

the Senate and I was out of the Senate at times, defeated
several times.
was out then

0

I wasn't in the Senate when he was there, I
But I knew him better when he was Vice-President.

The Vice-Presidents didn't have all the fancy offices they
have now~ he just had an office over in the Senate Office
Building, bout three doors from mine.

Curiously enough Jack

Kennedy was right across the hall from him.
RFM:

Is that right, huho

JSC:

I'd invite him over to my office and sometimes he'd call me

John Shennan Cooper

in ana we'a talk.

He was always very nice to meo

27

He never

got angry ana he always, although he didn't like my position.
But he once told me, "John, you oppose on several things that
are important to me but you never hit me personally."

And I

didn't and so, ana he callea me down to the White House once
in a while ana he'd talk to me about some things.

Whan

Eisenhower was President and the question was whether we shoula
send troops to Vietnam when the French were defeated, there
was talk around that Nixon favored sending at least air forces
in, I don't know whether that's true or not.

But he was always

a strong man for protecting the security of the United States
ana for that I applaude him, I believe we should maintain
defenses and sufficient forces and power at least to assure
our security ana to let the Soviets know they just can't run
over us.

Their abiding doctrine is to conquer the world

eventually - the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

President Nixon

was very anti - communist ana I think he had the iaea that
perhaps, thought Vietnamesation or strengthening our forces
he coula bring the North Vietna~ese to a position where they
woula be willing to reach some agreement.

And he placed two

eminent men in Paris, Averell Harriman and the former Secretary
Cyrus Vance

L

RFM:

Yeah._/ to negotiate with the Vietnamese.

Saw them several times in Paris.

They tola me that the North

Vietnamese talked alot about negotiations with unofficial US

John Sherman Cooper

visitors but, with them, there were no negotiations at all
about quitting.

We had US people go over there and talk to

the North Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese would say, "Oh
we're ready to negotiate any time."

I remember several of

those people who came back and just jumped all over me.
They would say we've seen the North Vietnamese, they say
they're ready to negotiate, settle all this.

Well, and

Harriman, Vance told me that their talks were just nothing,
no willingness to negotiate.

Finally, the war dragged out

and a kind of agreement was reached under which the South
Vietnamese weren't able to protect themselves.

The North

Vietnamese broke their agreement, just took over Vietnam and
of course now you see what they've done in Cambodia, which
is in a terrible situation.
RFM:

Yes, it's an awful situation, yeaho

Do you think, uh,

Nixon's Vietnamese, Vietnamesation policy moved fast or
he did move to withdraw troops and, and so forth.
JSC:

He withdrew some troops, you knowo

RFM:

Yeah.

But do you think that he was moving quickly enough

for Senator Cooper?
JSC:

Oh, it's hard to say, I have said, looking back I, I think
there never w·as any questions in the mind of Ho Chi Minh,
North Vietnamese leader.
particularly General Giap,

After his death, his successor,
(spells) G-I-A-P, who said from
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the beginning that the North Vietnamese were communist
revolutionaries, we speak out of the barrel of a rifle,
and that they were going to take North Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia.

Whether China or Russia would intervene, I think

was always in the minds of Johnson and Nixon, and I don't
see how they could have ever thought we could of won that war.
RFM:

I know in, in '72 if I remember correctly, you called for a
pullout of American troops in four months.

JSC:

What?

RFM:

In 1972 you pulled, you called for a pullout of American
troops in a, in a four month period.

JSC:

Yes, after, after Nixon announced he would
have them out by that time.

L

RFM:

Yeah./

But I put a section in my amendment

which was very much criticized.

I thought it was one which

"¼Duld, which would probably come closer to ending the war.
Every amendment which had been offered about a pullout
particularly that offered by Senator McGovernon and Brook
and Hatfield, just said pullout by a certain date, but
prescribing that our prisoners had to be released before the
US pulled out.

Well I felt that they were not going to release

our prisoners until there'd been an actual pullout on our part.
That was one of the ways they held us up.
left it out.

So my amendment

I just said we would withdraw in four months.

I was attacked on the floor rightfully they said it was inhuman.
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I said in response, ''do you think they're going to release
our prisoners as long as we are there and continue fighting.
Prisoners have always been released after a war and course
after everything was settled prisoners were released."
It is still claimed that 700 or more are unaccounted for.
But that was in '72.

I assume there will always be a number

whose fate will not be known .
RFM :

Do you think there was every possibility or did you hear
rumors that there might be tactical nuclear weapons used,
uh, in Vietnam?

Do you think there was ever any danger of that?

JSC:

Of what?

RFM :

Tactical nuclear weapons.

JSC :

No, I don't think so.

For example, if we'd actually started

a pullout and our troops were moving towards ports or air
fields, would be large accumulations of jammed groups.
be in a very vulnerable position .

They'd

The North Vietnamese could

have brought their troops in force and firing on our groups
which were withdrawingo
dangerous position.

Our troops would have been in a

There might be in that case, the use of

tactical nuclear weapons to protect the withdrawal of Americans.
RFM:

Okay, what about the use of chemical agents in Vietnam?

JSC:

Well they were used all up and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
to defoliate the trees so US planes could see the North Vietnam
troops coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trailo

I don't feel so bad
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Some people do but after all we were in the war,

our troops were being attacked and I don't know that these
chemicals were toxic on individuals.
RFM:

I think, I think its been proven out that they have been in
some cases.

JSC:

Yes, we know these chemicals do affect h~~an beings.

RFM:

Okay, I'm going to stop the tape here for just a second.
Now what, uh, this is giving you a chance to evaluate yourself.

JSC:

What?

RFM:

What, what mistakes do you think you made as a Senator in
relationship to the question of Vietnam?

JSC:

The biggest mistake I ever made was on the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution.

L

RFM:

My vote didn't affect its passing one iota

Yeah._/.

But I should have been a Senator against

it, because I knew and said at the time, that we were giving
President Johnson the power to take us into war.
three or four others who spoke against it.

There were

On the day that

it came up, the Senator from Wisconsin, Gaylord Nelson, who's
still a m!llber of the Senate raised some questions directed to
Senator Fulbright and even talk
but did not do so.

.ebout offering an amendment

A Senator from Maryland who was later

defeated afte~ serving one term, Daniel Brewster, actually
tried to offer an amendment and he was persuaded not to do
so.

If I had voted against it, I think they would have voted
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against ito

I believe Senator Mansfield would have voted

against ito

I believe George Aiken would've voted against it.

Church would have.

So I think that's all the effect my, there

might have been some others, but there wouldn't been, would
not have been many.

Johnson was a tremendous man on pressure.

I used to see him in the Senate when he was leader take these
Senators who were up and over in the corner and change their,
their votes
side a time.

(laughs).

He'd even come over on the Republican

He never did talk to me to change my vote but

he, I know two or three he did.

But he, he would, I can

remember an occasion when he thought there'd be ten or fifteen
voting against his proposals and then I remember one particularly
and then nearly all, he got hold of them.

I could see him

talking to them and ended up with only one Democrat opposing
him.

I let loyalty to our President and our troops in Vietnam

influence my vote.

Morse, although he was an able man and

did a lot of good things, did not have much influence in the
Senate because they considered him a kind of maverick.
Gruening was a good man, an older man, and was right but did
not carry great political influence.

He was greatly respected.

I always have believed that his great hero, not unexpected,
was Franklin D. Roosevelto

He wanted to do something great

on the domestic side like Franklin D. Roosevelto
reason he had for his health poverty programs.

That's the
That's the
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He believed in

these domestic programs, but I think he wanted to win a
war like Franklin Roosevelt.
RFM:

What do you consider to be your great success concerning,

L

JSC:

Hum?_/ what do you consider to be your greatest

success as far as the issue of Vietnam is concerned?
JSC:

Well, I was the first one that raised the question of its
constituting, and particularly lack of authority, to extend
the war into countries other than Vietnamo

It didn't draw

much attention at first, but it gradually did.

I was the

first one along with Senator Nelson who protested the bombing
of North Vietnam because we thought its cessation might offer
an opening for negotiations.
and 1966.

We spoke against bombing in 1965

I was the first one who asserted that the Congress

had the power through denying funds, to prevent and then stop
the expansion of the war into Ca~bodia and Laos.

Finally,

that you can prevent a war if it is not necessary for our
country's security.
RFM :

Okay.

One other question and I haven't, you know, we haven't

said anything really about the politics of Vietna~ and John
Sherman Cooper, but what impact did this have on you in the
State of Kentucky in a political sense, the stands you were
taking?
JSC:

Well you see some might say that I took my positions because
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But I'd taken stands before,

from 1954 to 1964, in favor of civil rights in 1960 and 1966.
Yet, I got a larger majority than I ever had after voting for
civil rights.

I won in

1

56 to fill out Senator Barkley's

four year term by about sixty-five thousand and in 1960 I
won my first six year term by 199,000 and in 1966 after the
1964 civil rights battle.

Although I got 30,000 letters

opposing me, I won by a larger majority of 217,000.

I hope

this doesn't sound egotistical, but I'm rather proud of it
a~d use it to illustrate my Vietnam position wasn't political

L

RFM:

(Laughs·) I'm sureo_/.

I carried every district in

the state, even the first district and all but five or six
countieso

It was the largest majority that anyone had ever

received for a state office.

I mean, elected by the stateo

President Johnson carried the state by a larger plurality
and Nixon carried larger in 1972.

I had decided in 1966 I

wouldn't run again because I knew if I lived I'd be 71 at the
time, and I wasn't going home and ask the people to keep me
in until I was 77.

Although now I'm 79.

I knew it took every

bit of your mental and physical strength to do the job and
I wasn't certain that I would have it.
good to me.

The people have been

Republicans and Democrats and I just felt it

wrong to go down there and say will you keep me in the Senate
until I'm 77 years old.

People have told me, "yes you could
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Even today they tell me that, even today they

tell me we wish you were in the Senate.
could just be complimentary.

I'm out.

But of course that
I'm no threat to

anybody and I get along fine with all the members of the
Kentucky delegation and we always did.

We worked together

on issues for Kentucky and we never had any trouble ana even
now I, I get along with all the Kentucky delegates.

I'm

called for help once in a while by different members of
Congress.

They call on me once in a while to testify before

committees, or other matters.
retiring.

But I think I did right in

I quit at the right time, in time for the younger

people to come along for their chance.
RFM:

Okay sir.

Do you have any, any other comments you'd like to

make on Vietnam that we didn't cover?
JSC:

Well I ao think that our long effort to secure negotiations
and close the war had effect.

When some of our forces were

marooned on an island off of Cambodia, President Fora sent
forces for their rescue.
for the action he took.

Although he's criticized by some
I do not criticize him.

some men but the rest of them got out.
Congress in advance of his action.

We lost

He did notify the

In a late effort to

rescue our hostages, President Carter didn't notify the Congress.
He just said it was not an invasion of Iran, but a rescue
attempt.

You can argue it both ways, but I do not criticize
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RFM:

Yeah, sureo_/.
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You have to be patriotic

I have been criticizing the Vietnam

situation where we backed into a war involving a half a
million Americans and thousands of dead and wounded.

As

to the rescue effort in Iran, although now it appears very
poorly organized, but I assume President Carter believed he
had to make the effort.

There is no reason why the President

should not come to Congress except in those cases where we
know our security is threatenedo

An example would be action

by the Soviets, the only ones with power to challenge us.
Another example, China has got the power now.

An attack on

this continent, Canada or perhaps Mexico, and certainly, our
western European NATO allies.

If the Soviets attacked Europe,

I would not say that the President does have the authority to
move without the express authority of the Congress, and of
course in the case of a nuclear disaster there would be no
other course.

In these cases the security of the United States

and its people would be under threat, and I believe the
President should act.
RFM:
JSC:

Yeah, sure.
I hope with all my heart that a Soviet-United States war
will never oc~ur.

Our people, as well as the Soviets, must

realize a nuclear war would kill most of our population and
most of the population of Russia and the European countries
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Even though the Russians with superior power might

prolong it, the end result would be the same - the destruction
of the world as we know it todayo

When I was in East Germany,

I found that even in those communist Warsaw Pact countries,
they're very fearful of a nuclear waro

They know they'd be

the first to go down in total destructiona
RFM:

Be the first to go o

JSC:

Be wiped outo

RFM:

Yeah, yeah.

JSC:

That's the reason they shout Detente so mucho

RFM :

Well Senator, thank you so much for the interviewo
very helpful,

L

JSC:

It'll be

What?_/ I said thank you so much for

the interviewo
JSC:

Well, you've helped me and I appreciate your interesto

I'll

just be glad when the election is over and whoever is elected,
we can resume efforts to build up a strong economy and to
build up our defenses so that we have a stronger deterrent
against war, and move toward a reduction of nuclear arms by
treaty, both the United States and Russia o

r

